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Medial prefrontal activity differentiates
self from close others
Todd F. Heatherton, Carrie L. Wyland, C. Neil Macrae, Kathryn E. Demos, Bryan T. Denny, and
William M. Kelley
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Center for Social Brain Sciences, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience,
Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA
A key question in psychology and neuroscience is the extent to which the neural representation of others is incorporated with,
or is distinct from, our concept of self. Recent neuroimaging research has emphasized the importance of a region in the medial
prefrontal cortex [MPFC; Brodmann’s area (BA) 10] when performing self-referent tasks. Specifically, previous studies have
reported selective MPFC recruitment when making judgments about the self relative to a familiar but personally unknown other.
The present event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging study extends these findings to judgments about personally
known others. Subjects were imaged while making trait adjective judgments in one of the three conditions: (i) whether the
adjective described the self; (ii) whether the adjective described an intimate other (i.e., a best friend); or (iii) whether the adjective
was presented in uppercase letters. Making judgments about the self relative to an intimate other selectively activated the MPFC
region previously implicated in the self-processing literature. These results suggest that while we may incorporate intimate others
into our self-concept, the neural correlates of the self remain distinct from intimate and non-intimate others.
Keywords: self; social cognition; memory; medial prefrontal cortex; fMRI
INTRODUCTION
An essential aspect of human experience is having a sense
of self that is unique and distinct from others. The self
encompasses such things as memory, cognition, agency,
somatosensory experience, and conscious awareness. It
includes a singular sense of identity, autobiographical
memories of the past, and expectations and beliefs about
the future. Although there has long been great enthusiasm
for understanding this important psychological construct, its
empirical examination has been hampered by the necessarily
subjective methods of obtaining relevant data about the self
(Macrae et al., 2004a). More recently, the use of neuroim-
aging methodologies (i.e., positron emission tomography;
PET and functional magnetic resonance imaging; fMRI) has
allowed researchers to resolve long-standing and vexing
issues regarding the nature of self.
A fundamental question about the self is whether it has
a privileged status in human cognition, such as enhancing
attention to, or memory for, information that is self-relevant
(Gillihan and Farah, 2005). Indeed, there is considerable
evidence that information encoded with reference to the self
is better remembered than information encoded about
others (Rogers et al., 1977), and recent imaging studies
have implicated a region in medial prefrontal cortex [MPFC;
Brodmann’s area (BA)10] during tasks that encourage
self-referencing (Craik et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2002;
Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004b; Ochsner et al., 2004;
Schmitz et al., 2004).
In the Kelley and colleagues (2002) study, participants
judged the trait adjectives in one of the three ways: self (‘does
the trait describe you?’); other (‘does the trait describe
George W. Bush?’) and case (‘is the trait presented in
uppercase letters?’). Self-judgments were selectively asso-
ciated with greater activation in MPFC. Moreover, the
enhanced activity in MPFC likely subserved the memorial
advantage afforded to self-referenced material. Macrae and
colleagues (2004b) recently demonstrated that activity in
MPFC can, on average, predict whether the items judged in
relation to self will later be remembered or forgotten.
The extent to which we include others in our self-concept
has been a topic of particular interest for social psychologists.
Theories of intimacy and personal relationships might
suggest that the self-reference effect is affected by the closeness
of a relationship with the other used as a target. Indeed,
Aron and colleagues (1991, 1996, 1999) define closeness as an
extension of self into other and suggest that one’s cognitive
processes about a close other develop in a way so as to include
that person as part of the self. Consistent with this idea,
it has been demonstrated that the memorial advantage
afforded to self-referenced material can be diminished or
eliminated when the comparison target is an intimate
other such as a parent, friend, or spouse (Bower and
Gilligan, 1979; Keenan and Baillet, 1980). In a meta-analysis
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of the self-reference effect in memory, Symons and Johnson
(1997) found a significant overall memory difference
for material encoded about the self compared with an
intimate other, but the effect size was much smaller than
when a familiar, but non-close, other was used for the
comparison. Additionally, only personal closeness, not
familiarity, influenced the effect sizes (Symons and Johnson,
1997). An open question is whether such attenuations of the
self-reference effect reflect common neural substrates for
judgments made about the self and personally close others.
A small number of neuroimaging studies have examined
this question and have provided mixed results (Ochsner
et al., 2005; Schmitz et al., 2004; Seger et al., 2004). Each
study used blocked-design fMRI, and each reported similar
neural activation patterns between self- and intimate-other
judgments. Seger and colleagues (2004) imaged subjects
while subjects made self-judgments about food preferences,
friend-judgments about food preferences, and superficial
judgments about food names (i.e., whether the food name
contained two vowels). MPFC activity did not differ when
self-judgments of food preference were contrasted directly
with comparable judgments about an intimate other’s food
preferences. Similarly, Ochsner and colleagues (2005)
imaged subjects while they were making self-judgments of
personality traits (similar to Craik et al., 1999; Johnson et al.,
2002; Kelley et al., 2002), close other-judgments of
personality traits, social desirability judgments of personality
traits, and syllable judgments of personality traits (i.e.,
whether the descriptor contained two syllables). Again,
MPFC activity did not differ when self- and other-judgments
were directly contrasted. Although Ochsner et al. (2005) and
Seger et al. (2004) failed to observe differences in MPFC
(i.e., BA 10) activity between self- and close-other judg-
ments, it is difficult to interpret these findings as evidence for
a shared neural representation because neither study
replicated previously reported differences between self- and
non-referential task conditions (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002;
Kelley et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004). Put simply, while
MPFC activity did not differ between self and close-other
conditions, it also did not differ between the self and the
superficial control conditions (vowel and syllable counting)
in each study. As such, it is difficult to know whether the
reported null effects in MPFC for self- vs close-other
judgments reflect a common functional architecture or an
inability to detect differences in MPFC activity.
A more compelling case for functional homogeneity in
making self- and close-other judgments can be made based
on Schmitz and colleagues’ (2004) finding that self-
judgments and friend-judgments of trait adjectives both
produced MPFC activation relative to a non-referential
control condition; however, MPFC activation did not differ
between self- and friend-judgments.
Given the inconsistencies and ambiguities reflected in the
extant literature, as well as the importance of identifying the
role of MPFC in social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006),
we elected to use event-related fMRI to examine the extent to
which MPFC activity differentiates self from close others.
The present study replicated the experimental paradigm
previously used by Kelley and colleagues (2002) with a single
key modification: the comparison target (George W. Bush)
was replaced with an intimate other (best friend) (Figure 1).
To the extent that intimate others are incorporated into
our self-concept (e.g., Aron et al., 1991), we would expect
similar MPFC activity when processing trait information
about the self and intimate others. Conversely, to the degree
that the self-concept is functionally unique relative to all
familiar others regardless of personal closeness, MPFC
activity should be greater for traits encoded with reference
to self than for traits encoded with reference to an intimate
other.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 30 participants between the ages of 18 and 31 years
(14 male, 16 female, mean age¼ 24 years) were recruited
from the local Dartmouth community. All the participants
were strongly right-handed as measured by the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Raczkowski et al., 1974). The
participants reported no significant abnormal neurological
history and all had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity. They were either paid for their participation or
received course credit. All participants gave informed
consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at
Dartmouth College. Difficulties with the fMRI-compatible
optical response keys prohibited the collection of behavioral
responses in eight of the 30 participants. Therefore,
behavioral results reported here reflect data analyzed from
the remaining 22 participants (12 male, 10 female; mean
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Fig. 1 Examples of the SELF, FRIEND, CASE, and fixation trial types. Trials were
randomly intermixed, and one trial was presented every 2.5 s. For each of the three
judgment trial types, the ‘cue’ (presented above the central fixation) indicated which
type of judgment to make for the trait adjective (presented below the fixation). The
paradigm was identical to Kelley and colleagues (2002) with the following exception:
the ‘other’ target used by Kelley and colleagues (George W. Bush) was changed to be
an intimate other (best friend).
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age¼ 23 years). However, fMRI data was successfully
collected in each of the 30 participants tested, and thus the
brain imaging results reported here reflect data from all the
30 participants.
Apparatus
Imaging was performed on a 1.5 Tesla whole body scanner
(General Electric Medical Systems Signa, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin) with a standard head coil. Visual stimuli were
generated using an Apple G3 Laptop computer running
PsyScope software (Cohen et al., 1993). Stimuli were
projected to participants with an Epson (model ELP-7000)
LCD projector onto a screen positioned at the head end
of the bore. Participants viewed the screen through a mirror.
A fibre-optic, light-sensitive key press interfaced with the
PsyScope Button Box (New Micros, Dallas, Texas) was used
to record participants’ behavioral responses. Cushions were
used to minimize head movement.
Imaging
Anatomical images were acquired using a high resolution
3D spoiled gradient recovery sequence (SPGR; 124
sagittal slices, TE¼ 6ms, TR¼ 25ms, flip angle¼ 258,
voxel size¼ 1 1 1.2mm). Functional images were col-
lected in runs using a gradient spin-echo echo-planar
sequence sensitive to blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) contrast (T2*) (TR¼ 2500ms, T2* evolution
time¼ 35ms, flip angle¼ 908, 3.75 3.75mm in-plane
resolution). During each functional run, 75 sets of axial
images (27 slices; 4.5mm slice thickness, 1mm skip between
slices) were acquired allowing complete brain coverage.
Behavioral tasks
Prior to scanning, each subject was asked to identify a
specific best friend to be used as a comparison target in the
study. Participants were imaged during two functional runs
while making judgments about trait adjectives. Judgments
were one of three types: SELF (‘Does this adjective describe
you?’); FRIEND (‘Does this adjective describe your best
friend’); and CASE (‘Is this adjective printed in uppercase
letters?’). The participants indicated their responses via a
left- or right-handed key press. Each trial lasted 2500ms and
consisted of a ‘cue’ word (either SELF, FRIEND, or CASE)
presented for 2000ms above a central fixation and a unique
trait adjective (e.g., ‘POLITE’) presented for 2000ms below a
central fixation (Figure 1). The central fixation remained on
the screen throughout the duration of each trial. All text was
presented in Geneva font (white letters on a black back-
ground; letters subtended 0.58 of visual angle). Prior to the
first functional run, participants were given practice trials to
familiarize them with the tasks. Practice continued until
participants indicated they were comfortable with the tasks.
A total of 270 unique adjectives were selected from a pool
of normalized personality trait adjectives (Anderson, 1968).
Lists were counterbalanced for word length, number of
syllables, and valence (half of the words in each list were
positive traits, the remaining half were negative traits).
Across participants, lists were rotated through conditions
such that trait adjectives that appeared in the SELF-
judgment trials for one participant appeared in a different
condition (FRIEND or CASE) for other participants. During
each of the two functional runs, 15 SELF trials, 15 FRIEND
trials, 15 CASE trials, and 30 fixation trials were pseudo-
randomly intermixed such that each trial type followed every
other trial type equally often. The fixation trials consisted of
a central fixation point presented on the screen for 2500ms.
These trials were included to introduce ‘jitter’ into the time
series so that unique estimates of the hemodynamic
responses for the trial types of interest could be computed
(Ollinger et al., 2001) (see ‘Data analysis’ section
subsequently).
Following the two encoding runs, participants were given
a ‘surprise’ recognition memory test (not scanned).
Participants viewed the 90 trait adjectives that were
previously presented during the encoding scans along with
90 novel trait adjectives that had not been presented during
the encoding scans. Words were presented sequentially in the
center of the computer screen for 2000ms. A fixation point
(500ms) preceded each word. For each word, the partici-
pants indicated (via left- and right-handed key presses)
whether the word was old or new.
Data analysis
The fMRI data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric
Mapping software (SPM99, Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) (Friston et al., 1995).
For each functional run, data were pre-processed to remove
sources of noise and artifact. The functional data were
corrected for differences in acquisition time between slices
for each whole-brain volume, realigned within and across
runs to correct for head movement, and co-registered with
each participant’s anatomical data. The functional data were
then transformed into a standard anatomical space (3mm
isotropic voxels) based on the ICBM 152 brain template
(Montreal Neurological Institute) which approximates
Talairach and Tournoux (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988)
atlas space. Normalized data were then spatially smoothed
[6mm full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM)] using a
Gaussian kernel.
For each participant, a general linear model, incorporating
task effects (modelled with a canonical set of three functions:
the hemodynamic response function, its temporal derivative,
and its dispersion derivative) (Friston et al., 1998) and
covariates of no interest (a session mean, a linear trend, and
six movement parameters derived from realignment correc-
tions) was used to compute parameter estimates () and
t-contrast images (containing weighted parameter estimates)
for each comparison at each voxel. These individual contrast
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images were used in a hypothesis-driven region-of-interest
(ROI) analysis focusing on MPFC.
The present study sought to examine the selectivity of
MPFC during judgments about the self and an intimate
other. To quantify signal change in MPFC for the three trial
types in an unbiased manner, a spherical ROI (10, 52, 2;
10mm radius) was defined based on Kelley and colleagues
(2002). In this way, the same MPFC region that revealed
differential activity between SELF and a non-close OTHER
in our previous work could be interrogated for differences
in activity when the OTHER target was altered to be an
intimate other (i.e., best friend). For each participant,
parameter estimates of signal change for each trial type
relative to the baseline control condition (fixating a cross-
hair) were computed across all voxels within the MPFC ROI
and examined statistically using repeated-measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA).
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Table 1 shows behavioral performance measures for each
trial type. An ANOVA showed that response latencies
for encoding trials were slowest for SELF-judgments
(M¼ 1772ms) and fastest for CASE-judgments
(M¼ 1600ms), F[2, 42]¼ 16.8, P< 0.0001. Post-hoc statisti-
cal tests revealed that response latencies were significantly
faster for CASE-judgments than for SELF-judgments
(F[1, 21]¼ 30.5, P< 0.0001) and FRIEND-judgments
(F[1, 21]¼ 16.1, P< 0.0005). The difference in response
latencies between SELF and FRIEND judgments was not
significant (F[1, 21]¼ 2.3, P¼ 0.14).
Accurate performance on the yes/no recognition memory
test was used as an indication that successful encoding had
occurred. Recognition memory performance was determined
by calculating corrected recognition scores (proportion of
HITS–FALSE ALARMS). An ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of trial type (F[1, 42]¼ 93.8, P< 0.0001).
Post-hoc statistical tests revealed significant differences in
subsequent memory for SELF and FRIEND adjectives
(F[1, 21]¼ 7.4, P< 0.01), SELF and CASE adjectives
(F[1, 21]¼ 168.7, P< 0.0001), and FRIEND and CASE
adjectives (F[1, 21]¼ 105.3, P< .0001).
fMRI results
The present study sought to determine whether the MPFC
activity observed during self-reference tasks in previous work
(Craik et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002;
Macrae et al., 2004b; Ochsner et al., 2004; Schmitz et al.,
2004) would extend to the judgments about others if the
target was a personally known other. As such, a hypothesis-
driven analysis was performed using an a priori-defined ROI
in MPFC (10, 52, 2; BA 10) based on Kelley and colleagues
(2002). This region demonstrated a robust difference
between self-judgments and judgments about a familiar
but not personally known other (George W. Bush) and
provided an ideal test of the current question.
The targeted ROI analysis, shown in Figure 2, revealed
a significant main effect of task condition (F[2, 58]¼ 6.4,
P< 0.005), and, consistent with prior work, post-hoc
statistical tests revealed significant differences in MPFC
activity between SELF and FRIEND conditions
(F[1, 29]¼ 10.8, P< 0.005) and SELF and CASE conditions
(F[1, 29]¼ 6.3, P< 0.05). There was no significant difference
in MPFC activity between FRIEND and CASE conditions
(F < 1).1
These findings differ from findings by Schmitz and
colleagues (2004) showing statistical differences in MPFC
activity between self and semantic judgments, close-other
and semantic judgments, but not between self and close-
other judgments. To examine whether the difference across
−0.4
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−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
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Fig. 2 An a priori region-of-interest (ROI) in MPFC based on Kelley and colleagues
(2002) was used to compute mean signal change during SELF-, FRIEND-, and CASE-
judgments. Signal intensities for each condition are plotted relative to a baseline
control condition (fixating a crosshair). Similar to the previous work, MPFC activity
was uniquely sensitive to self judgments. Case-judgments and judgments about an
intimate other produced robust decreases in MPFC activity that did not differ from
each other.
Table 1 Behavioral performance during encoding and recognition tasks
Task Encoding reaction time (ms) Hits–false alarms
SELF 1772 (29) 0.62 (0.04)
FRIEND 1725 (39) 0.53 (0.03)
CASE 1600 (27) 0.21 (0.05)
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
1 As noted in the methods, technical problems with the optical key presses prevented behavioral data from
being collected in 8 of the 30 participants tested. However, similar MPFC findings were noted when only the
22 participants for whom behavioral data were available were considered in the hypothesis-driven fMRI
analysis. There was an overall main effect of task condition (F[2, 42] ¼ 4.4, P < 0.05), and post-hoc statistical
tests again revealed significant differences between SELF and FRIEND conditions (F[1, 21]¼ 7.8, P < 0.01) and
SELF and CASE conditions (F[1, 21]¼ 5.2, P < 0.05). Again, MPFC activity between FRIEND and CASE
conditions did not differ (F < 1).
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studies was a result of anatomical differences in the location
of MPFC activity, we repeated our ROI analysis using a ROI
defined directly from Schmitz et al. (2004). Specifically,
a spherical ROI (10mm radius) was centered on -4, 58,
4 [identified in the comparison of close other > semantic,
in Schmitz et al. (2004), Table 1, p. 944]. Results revealed
a significant main effect of task condition (F[2,58]¼ 11.7,
P< 0.0001). Post-hoc statistical comparisons revealed sig-
nificant differences in MPFC activity between SELF and
FRIEND conditions (F[1, 29]¼ 15.5, P< 0.0005) and SELF
and CASE conditions (F[1, 29]¼ 19.3, P< 0.0001). Again,
there was no significant difference between FRIEND and
CASE conditions (F < 1).
Although the present results focus on a targeted explora-
tion of MPFC activity, whole-brain imaging was performed
in this study. Figure 3 and Table 2 summarize significant
activations in other brain regions that were observed during
each direct comparison.
Table 2 Identification of BOLD signal changes associated with the direct comparisons between SELF and FRIEND, SELF and CASE, and FRIEND and CASE
conditions
Brain region T x y z
SELF > FRIEND
BA32 Anterior cingulate gyrus 5.73 0 39 17
BA10 Middle frontal gyrus 5.34 9 55 3
BA10 Middle frontal gyrus 4.61 6 58 3
BA47 L inferior frontal gyrus 4.95 45 23 11
BA47 R inferior frontal gyrus 4.80 48 34 12
BA47 R inferior frontal gyrus 4.05 45 14 3
BA21 R middle temporal gyrus 4.51 59 38 1
BA6 Superior frontal gyrus 4.12 12 23 54
BA37 L fusiform gyrus 3.95 48 68 14
FRIEND > SELF
BA7/40 L inferior parietal lobule 3.82 39 59 44
Cerebellum R cerebellum 4.61 15 48 25
SELF > CASE
BA47 L inferior frontal gyrus 6.30 45 23 11
BA47 R inferior frontal gyrus 4.36 50 23 11
BA10 Middle frontal gyrus 5.70 9 58 0
BA19 L fusiform gyrus 4.48 33 71 14
BA29/30 Posterior cingulate cortex 4.35 3 46 19
Cerebellum R cerebellum 4.60 27 74 24
FRIEND > CASE
BA47 L inferior frontal gyrus 4.34 30 31 24
BA11 Gyrus rectus 4.01 3 34 24
BA32 Anterior cingulate gyrus 3.65 0 14 46
Activations determined to be significant are listed along with the best estimate of their location. BA, approximate Brodmann’s area location. Coordinates are from the Talairach
and Tournoux (1988) atlas. Locations of the activations are determined based on the functional responses superimposed on averaged anatomical MRI images and are referenced
to the Talairach atlas.
SELF > FRIEND SELF > CASE FRIEND > CASE
P < 0.001 max
Fig. 3 An inflated cortical rendering of the left hemisphere (Van Essen et al., 2001) illustrates significant MPFC activity during direct comparisons between SELF and FRIEND (left),
SELF and CASE (middle), and FRIEND and CASE (right).
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DISCUSSION
The present study used event-related fMRI to assess whether
making trait adjective judgments about the self relative to an
intimate other preferentially activated a region of the MPFC
that has been implicated in self-referential processing (Craik
et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae
et al., 2004b; Ochsner et al., 2004; Schmitz et al., 2004).
Behavioral data were consistent with the predictions of the
self-reference memory effect; on a ‘surprise’ recognition
memory test given after the trait judgments were made in the
scanner, participants remembered those words that were
self-referenced better than those that described an intimate
other or a case judgment. Further, consistent with the results
of a meta-analysis by Symons and Johnson (1997), the effect
size for this self-referent memory advantage was reduced in
comparison with the effect size reported by Kelley and
colleagues (2002), where a familiar, but not intimate, other
was used (George W. Bush).
Although differences in recognition memory performance
for self- and intimate other-judgments were modest, neural
response differences in the MPFC as measured by BOLD
signal were robust. Whereas neural responses to self-
judgments in the same MPFC ROI reported in Kelley and
colleagues (2002) approximated a baseline level of MPFC
activity, neural responses to intimate other- and non-
referential-judgments were significantly deactivated relative
to baseline. This near-baseline level of activation observed
in the MPFC when participants made self-judgments is
consistent with the ‘default mode’ hypothesis of functional
baseline activation proposed by Raichle and colleagues
(2001). The present results indicate an MPFC response
that is self-specific—namely judgments pertaining to oneself
were seen to be distinct from those made for one’s friend. In
line with this notion, Moran and colleagues (in press) have
recently demonstrated that MPFC activity tracks in a linear
fashion with ratings of self-descriptiveness. That is, within
the task of self-referencing, personally relevant material
engages MPFC to a greater extent than material that is
judged less relevant. This is true regardless of whether the
self-descriptive material is positive (e.g., honest) or negative
(e.g., lazy) in valence (see also Fossati et al., 2003, 2004).
Likewise, Mitchell and colleagues (2005) demonstrated a
positive correlation between MPFC activity and perceived
self/other similarity when subjects were asked to predict the
emotional state of unfamiliar faces.
These findings also fit nicely with results from Macrae and
colleagues (2004b) showing that the memorial advantage
afforded to self-referenced items appears to be driven by
differences in MPFC activity. Specifically, activity in MPFC
at the time a trait is judged is predictive of whether the trait
word will later be remembered or forgotten on a subsequent
surprise memory test. Here, memory for self-referenced
items was superior to memory for intimate other-referenced
items, and MPFC activity differentiated these two judgment
types. Thus, to the degree that such memorial effects exist
between self- and intimate other-judgments, one might
expect MPFC activity to index the memory effect.
Behaviorally, the presence or absence of a self-memory
advantage over close others is variable across studies
(Symons and Johnson, 1997). This variance may, in part,
explain the discrepant findings on MPFC activity when self-
and close-other judgments are contrasted. None of the prior
work in this domain (Ochsner et al., 2005; Seger et al., 2004;
Schmitz et al., 2004) explicitly tested subsequent memory for
the referenced materials; future work exploring the relation-
ship between the self-reference memory effect and MPFC
activity when self is contrasted with an other may elucidate a
common underlying mechanism in situations when the
memorial effect is weak or absent and divergent functional
anatomic differences when the memorial effect is modest or
large.
The absence of memory data in the three previously
published neuroimaging studies on this topic makes it
difficult to reconcile the differences in MPFC activity
reported here and elsewhere. A further complication is that
the present study used event-related fMRI whereas all three
previous studies employed blocked-design analyzes. That is,
each study presented the to-be-judged material in blocks
such that the task judgment was consistent across the block
of items. In this way, self-judgments were made on a series of
consecutive items and contrasted to the task of making
other- or non-referential judgments on a separate series
of consecutive items. The resulting difference image in a
blocked-design analysis reflects a combination of the
sustained processes related to the general situation or task
setting (i.e., state effects) and the transient processes more
directly related to processing of individual stimuli (i.e., item
effects). That is, whereas event-related designs are only
sensitive to transient changes in the hemodynamic response
that are time-locked to the events of interest (item-effects),
blocked paradigms are additionally sensitive to sustained
signal changes that persist over time (state-effects) and are
not necessarily modulated on an item-by-item basis. As
such, blocked paradigms confound state- and item-related
effects. That is, it is not possible to dissociate effects that are
tonic and longer-lasting from effects that are stimulus-
specific and wedded to current mental operations.
Given that MPFC activity is tonically active at rest
(Raichle et al., 2001; Gusnard and Raichle, 2001), certain
blocked-design paradigms may struggle to capture item-
specific differences between conditions. Put simply, if a task
block contains modest amounts of rest, either as a result of
long inter-trial intervals or by the explicit inclusion of null
events, the tonic MPFC response to rest may overwhelm
signal differences that might be present at the item-level.
For example, Ochsner and colleagues (2005) utilized a
hybrid, event-related/blocked-design approach, where trials
within a task block were temporally jittered to permit both
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blocked- and event-related analysis of the data. Thus, task
blocks for all conditions necessarily contained large amounts
of rest within the blocks. When the data were examined
using a blocked-design analysis, MPFC (BA 10) activity did
not differ across any of the conditions. One possibility for
these findings is that MPFC activity was tonically high for all
conditions, thereby masking potential differences at the
item-level. A flexible feature of hybrid blocked/event-related
designs is the ability to separate sustained, state-effects from
transient item-effects. As such, it would be interesting to
know whether MPFC activity revealed transient differences
between self- and close-other judgments in their study.
It is difficult to reconcile the present results with the prior
study by Schmitz and colleagues (2004), particularly in light
of our targeted ROI analysis using a region derived directly
from their work. Whereas the present study employed an
event-related design and tested 30 subjects, Schmitz and
colleagues (2004) employed a blocked-design analysis and
analyzed data from 18 subjects. Because both studies
employed random-effects analyzes, statistical power to
detect differences is driven largely by subject sample size.
To the degree that signal differences between self and close-
others are more subtle than self and semantic judgments
or close-other and semantic judgments, such effects might
only be captured via fMRI when using large sample sizes.
Because Schmitz and colleagues (2004) do not report
ROI-based analyzes of signal change in MPFC, it is difficult
to know whether subtle differences in MPFC activity
between self and close-other were present but did not
reach statistical significance in a smaller sample size.
It is important to note that the present study used a
rather conservative approach to address whether self- and
close-other judgments produced comparable MPFC
activity. The MPFC ROI was defined from an entirely
independent data set (Kelley et al., 2002) comparing self-
judgments to judgments about a familiar but personally
unknown other (George W. Bush). This region was then
interrogated for replication in the current data set. The
rationale for using a replication approach is based on the
assumption that reproducibility of an activation across data
sets is the strongest indication that the activation generalizes
and is not attributable to spurious artifacts (e.g., motion).
One important caveat regarding the current findings
pertains to the possibility that making judgments about close
others who are even more intimate than a best friend, such
as a spouse or life partner, would produce neural activation
that is more commensurate with self-referent activation.
Future research may shed light on this possibility.
In summary, the present study offers further evidence of
a specialized role for MPFC when task demands encourage
self-focused attention. Behavioral results illustrated a modest
but significant memorial self-reference effect for self-
referenced material (consistent with Bower and Gilligan,
1979; Keenan and Baillet, 1980), and event-related fMRI
revealed significant differences in trait judgment processing
between the self and an intimate other in the MPFC. Thus,
although we may seem to incorporate knowledge about
others into our self-concept by integrating them into our
memorial self-bias, the current results suggest that the neural
mechanisms subserving this representation are likely to differ
from the neural representation of self-knowledge.
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